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Marcus A. Doel 
 
Abstract. Given that the working title of the collection of essays gathered in this 
issue of the journal was ‘children displaced across borders,’ the paper considers 
the implications of this strange and arresting word, ‘displaced,’ which can be read 
in conflicting ways, depending on the weight, stress, and strain that one applies to 
the rift that traverses it: displaced, dis-placed, and di-splaced. Drawing upon 
structuralist and poststructuralist influences, such as Alain Badiou, Maurice 
Blanchot, Jacques Derrida, and Jacques Lacan, the paper stresses the place of 
displacement and the displacement of place, and deconstructs the ‘taking place’ 
of each, as well as of emplacement, misplacement, and mal-placement. The 
comeuppance of this contortion in the fabric of space–time is an unfathomable 
commotion or ‘loco-commotion’ in the structure of placement, where ‘displaced 
children,’ like any split subject, come to be ‘splaced’ out and ‘splayed’ out. 
 







the self as though emplaced 
set in its depths, 
braced 
waiting (Michaux 1992, 181) 
 
Behold our hollows. (Beckett 2009, 60) 
 
By way of introduction: reading displaced 
Everything that exists is thus at the same time itself and itself-according-to-its-place. … 
All that is relates to itself at a distance from itself owing to the place where it is. 
(Badiou 2009a, 8) 
 
‘Children displaced across borders,’ he writes or she writes from afar. Receding into the 
distance from the off, I ponder this weird titular sentence, and especially the peculiar 
and perhaps superfluous word that is inserted or suspended like a vanishing mediator 
between the children and the borders, as if from hooks, barbs, scare quotes or some 
other tear-jerking device: ‘displaced.’ I wonder from afar what such an oddly braced 
and strangely emplaced ‘displacement’ adds to the figure of border-crossing or border-
straddling children, other than a vague sense of misdirection, hollowing out, and self 
effacement, and an evocative sense of enforced, involuntary, and compulsory volition, 
either blindly, mindlessly or thoughtlessly executed by the forces of nature, so called, or 
else wilfully, consciously or knowingly prosecuted by some nefarious agency, such as 
military, paramilitary or police forces: ‘dis-placed’ in deed. I ponder the intrinsic and 
inherent violence of displacement as things are shoved carelesswise hither and thither 
by a multitude of displacers, but also the gentleness of displacement, when it aims to 
conserve and preserve what would otherwise be lost, exhausted or spent: for example, a 
delicate, precise, and careful displacement of forces and assets for tactical or strategic 
reasons. I mull over the prefix ‘dis-,’ which, according to the Oxford English 
Dictionary, may express aversion, negation, the reversal or absence of an action or state, 
the removal, separation or expulsion of something, and the completion or intensification 
of an unpleasant or unattractive action; in twain, in different directions, apart, asunder, 
and hence abroad, away. (In what follows I will read all of these senses into the word 
‘displaced’ rather than limit myself to the usual association of child displacement with 
DOI: 10.1080/14733285.2020.1773403 
 4 
mere detachment, separation, and removal. In fact, I wager that everything will remain 
suspended in twain: placed, displaced, which hinges as much on the ‘di-’ as the ‘dis-,’ 
and which invites a series of uncanny doubles into our midst, beginning with the giving 
and taking of place.) I also mull over the French etymons of displace, déplacer and 
desplacer, which in turn makes me ponder the notion of ‘splace’ that confounds the 
clear-cut separation of ‘place’ and ‘space’ by splaying them out (Doel, 1999, 2014), all 
of which leads me to toy with the idea of splicing ‘space’ and ‘place’ with ‘splay’ and 
‘play,’ but the resulting neologism, ‘splayce,’ suddenly makes me yearn for our 
quotidian ‘places’ to be dubbed ‘playces.’ I would love the fallout from this childish 
homonym to settle on the surrounding landscape like snow, revolutionizing everyday 
life in its wake: “When snow falls on cities, the child, taking over for a while, is all at 
once Lord of the city” (Aldo van Eyck, quoted in Strauven 1998, 169). Consequently, 
the word ‘displaced’ no longer seems to be exhausted by the sense of taking over the 
place, position, or role of something else, or of moving something from its proper or 
usual position, or else of removing someone from a position of authority, or even of 
forcing someone to leave their home or homeland, and hence abroad, away, asunder. 
There is so much more that needs to be played out and splayed out, and this will be my 
focus in what follows. Eriksson (2019), for example, went some way in this direction by 
‘converging one place into another in order to identify three coexisting preschool 
displacements – locations, dimensions and positions,’ as did Cresswell (2013), via a 
trilogy of poetic displacements, yet the dissemination of displacement always seems to 
fall short, falling back on placement and re-placement. Grasp the ‘dis-’ of displacement, 
and hold on to the ‘place’ of displacement, if you can. These are not only ontological 
but also ethical imperatives: ‘Not grasping that which flees, not at all. But grasping 
fleeing qua vanishing point’ (Badiou 2009b, 133). 
 
Quickly retracing my steps, I return whence I came, to the spot where 
displacement takes place, in the double sense of occurrence (i.e. the taking place, there 
where it happens) and thievery (i.e. the taken place, as it steals away): emplaced (…) 
displaced. For rather than displacement from place to place, I am interested in the 
displacement of place and the place of displacement. Where does displacement ‘take’ 
place? Perhaps it takes it on a ‘stationary voyage’ or a ‘stationary process,’ as Deleuze 
and Guattari (1998, 151 and 381) famously put it, which is intensive rather than 
extensive. For here as elsewhere, if you follow these displaced children on their 
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‘stationary trips,’ or allow them to follow you, they are forever ‘approaching without 
getting nearer’ (Derrida 2008, 21). They are ostensibly lost (i.e. found) betwixt and 
between an implacable and unforgiving structure of placements, for which the word 
‘borders’ serves as a synecdoche. (Displaced across borders means displaced within a 
structure of placements, which begs the question of establishing the difference between 
placing and displacing, and between placement and displacement, and of locating where 
each takes place, where each is taken, and where each is given [Deleuze 2004].) Such a 
structure takes care of place, both in the positive sense of curation (as if it were a 
caretaker or a caregiver) and in the negative sense of assassination (as if it were a 
terminator or an exterminator). We will come back to this ambivalence again and again 
in what follows, not least because some agency or other will undoubtedly be called 
upon to ‘take care’ of these ‘displaced children,’ perhaps with a shower of gifts and a 
wall of smiles or else with a cloud of tear gas and a curl of razor wire, as well as with an 
avalanche of red tape and a barrage of legalese. So, we will need to tread very carefully 
around the place where displacement takes place, not least because of the commotion 
that it invariably stirs up. Accordingly, the rest of the paper proceeds by way of five 
tentative steps. The first steps into the space of displacement, while the second slips into 
a broader space of placement, emplacement, displacement, misplacement, and mal-
placement. Skipping ahead, the third step enables the figure of the ‘displaced child’ to 
enter the scene from a borderland that will remain screened off. This then paves the way 
for the penultimate step, wherein the figure of the ‘displaced child’ becomes 
indiscernible and undecidable. By way of conclusion, the final step ends on a customary 
high, with an improbable up rising; specifically, a rising up of what has been discounted 
and repressed within the extant space of placements. This glorious step will, however, 
almost certainly get lost within the general commotion that this uprising stirs up. 
 
Loco-commotion in the structure of placement 
Space hesitates about its identity. (Lyotard 1990a, 131) 
 
Where other readers may take a sentence such as ‘children displaced across borders’ in 
their stride, I am snagged by that queer word, ‘displaced,’ which can be read in at least 
three ways: displaced, or else dis-placed, or even di-splaced, with more or less weight 
brought to bear on its cracked, cavernous, and abyssal interior: dis-placed, dis–placed, 
dis—placed, dis—(…)—placed, etc. Plumb the unfathomable depths of a ‘displaced 
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child’ or a ‘child displaced’ (split up to your own liking) as it traverses the crazy paving 
of the real, the imaginary, and the symbolic, if you can. These split subjects, like all 
subjects, are emplaced (…) displaced. Behold his or her hollows. 
 
What has been said so far? Little more than this: displacement does not come 
after placement, least of all as a negative disturbance, since every place is always 
already spaced out and splayed out. Place is turned inside out and turns itself inside out.  
Perhaps the prefix ‘dis-’ serves only to counter-sign, reaffirm, and redouble this 
irreducible contortion of place: ‘di-splace’ rather than ‘dis-place,’ so to speak. Yes, yes: 
placed, displaced. And this is where the border comes back in, from the inside out no 
less than from the outside in. For while a border ostensibly marks the threshold, more or 
less permeable, between an inside and an outside, it is itself neither one nor the other; it 
is neutral (ne uter), hollow (...), and inclined to swallow up whatever steps into its 
breach (De León 2015). I am reminded of Robert Coover’s convoluted short story, 
‘Playing House,’ in A Child Again: 
 
Once there was a house, the storyteller continues, which was struck by a hurricane and 
turned inside out, the outside closed within it, its own dimensions infinite and 
unknowable at what was once the core, more like the edge. Those within moved out, 
which of course was further in, and there they built a new house looking out in all 
directions upon the inverted old. (Coover 2005, 65) 
 
Now, what strikes me most forcefully about the occurrence of the word 
‘displaced’ in the expression ‘children displaced across borders’ is not so much the 
force of this word (its positional shifting, ousting, supplanting, removing, replacing, etc. 
within a given spatial order), least of all in the sense of a pleonastic forced displacement 
or forced migration that can be either involuntary (i.e. imposed on the unwilling) or 
non-voluntary (i.e. imposed on those who lack the capacity or are deprived of the 
opportunity to consent or dissent), which would seem (for some at least) to characterize 
the mobility of children as such, since they are invariably placed at the mercy and 
disposal of their family and other caretakers and caregivers. While I appreciate that this 
characterization has been thoroughly contested, not least in the pages of this journal, 
since it ostensibly neglects the agency and ‘response-ability’ of children, I invoke it 
here because it accords with displacement conceived in terms of force. And yet, while 
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children no doubt enjoy travelling ‘a great deal at the bottom of [their] bed[s],’ as 
Georges Perec (1999, 17) so wonderfully put it, I wager that few of them enjoy 
travelling very far from them. 
 
So, what strikes me most forcefully about the occurrence of the word ‘displaced’ 
in the expression ‘children displaced across borders’ is not so much the force of this 
word and how it might be countered or resisted (force against force), but rather the 
disappearance of the parentheses that featured in the original call for papers: 
‘(Dis)placed children and their rights.’ In the passage from ‘(dis)placed children’ to 
‘children displaced’—which is to say, from the ‘(dis)placed’ to the ‘displaced,’ from the 
‘(dis)’ to the ‘dis,’ from the ‘(…)’ to the ‘…’—a few critical steps have slipped away or 
stolen away, including a displaced place and a place displaced. Ponder, then, these 
transpositional slips that destabilize the meaning, reference, and sense of the word 
‘displaced’ as we steal our way with those children forced to step [pas] (or not [pas]) 
across borders: (dis)place, (dis)placed, and (dis)placement; dis-place, dis-placed, and 
dis-placement; dis—place, dis—placed, and dis—placement; dis—(…)—place, dis—
(…)—placed, and dis—(…)—placement; etc.; including the vexed problem of how to 
parenthesize ‘displace,’ ‘displaced,’ and ‘displacement,’ and, since I have already 
mentioned the neologism ‘splace’ several times over, the even more wicked problem of 
how to cut ‘space’ and ‘place,’ splice them with ‘time’ and ‘motion,’ and interlace them 
with ‘presence’ and ‘absence,’ which the quasi-concept of différance coined by Derrida 
(1982) offers a resolution of sorts, if only as a device to relay and amplify the 
commotion or loco-commotion in the structure of placement. 
 
Unthinking displacement 
Let us space. (Derrida 1986, 75) 
 
Having cut a dash through the space of displacement, let the expression ‘children 
displaced across borders’ swill around your mind’s eye whilst allowing the conjunction 
and disjunction of these children and those borders to be spread out, stretched out, and 
splayed out among five incommensurable dimensions and incompossible states: 
placement, emplacement, displacement, misplacement, and mal-placement. These 
dimensions herald a perilous board game of allotment, arrogation, and disgregation 
played out on a criss-crossed, chequered or bordured surface. Indeed, I wager that the 
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expression ‘children displaced across borders’ will have aroused your natalitious 
geopolitical unconscious and solicited the phantom presence of myriad ‘inter-national’ 
and ‘inter-natal’ relations, if only as vanishing mediators: ‘children displaced across 
national borders.’ Edging crosswise, hatch an image, if you can, of children flickering 
between these five dimensions and circulating amongst these five states: placement, 
emplacement, displacement, misplacement, and mal-placement. Take note of the axes, 
axles, and pivots around which they revolve and rotate, and the spit-wheel or suchlike 
that keeps the whole jerry-built contraption in motion, commotion, and ‘locommotion’ 
(Malabou and Derrida 2004). 
 
Of the five dimensions that I have briefly mentioned (placed, emplaced, displaced, 
misplaced, and mal-placed), the last two are arguably the most pernicious, since what 
matters is perhaps not so much whether children are here or there, (em)placed or 
(dis)placed, but whether they are in place (fitting, settled, suited, reposed, etc.) or out of 
place (unfitting, unsettled, ill-suited, disturbed, etc.), whether they are well placed 
(accordable, comfortable, conformable, etc.) or badly placed (discordable, 
discomfortable, disconformable, etc.), and whether they are accounted for as integral 
and wholesome or as remainders and exceptions (which begs the question of how they 
will be ‘rounded up’ in the national accounts, at the border, and on the streets). 
Displaced children would then not simply be in the wrong and improper place, like 
square pegs in round holes, they would also be wronged by place, damaged by place, 
and disfigured by place: mal-placed with mal-volition and mal-direction (alienated, 
estranged, outcast, etc.). Accordingly, I wager that few if any readers of this journal will 
be able to swallow the expression ‘children displaced across borders’ without some 
disrelish, discomfiture, and distaste, without some sense of crossing out and cancelling 
out, of effacement and erasure, and of maladjustment and malaise in the real, the 
symbolic, and the imaginary registers. Echenwiler (2018), for example, builds on 
Casey’s (2009, 321) claim that human beings are ‘placelings’ (i.e. always already 
placed, constitutively emplaced, and never without placebound experiences) to suggest 
that the ‘displaced’ are akin to the ‘precariously placed’ or ‘insecurely placed,’ and that 
those with secure embedment should ‘forge relations of solidarity and promote justice 
through ethical place-making with those who are vulnerable through their insecure 
relationship to place’ (Echenwiler 2018, 568). Such a loose conception would, however, 
barely scratch the surface of all of the ways in which children may become lost in place, 
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lost from place, and lost to place, or else lost in-from-to space, or even lost in-from-to 
splace. 
 
Amid the wreckage of the phrase ‘children displaced across borders’ we may 
discern the precarious trace of what remains of the out of place, of the out-place, of 
(not) belonging there. I am tempted to emphasize the extent of this prolonged 
displacement through an anamorphic distortion, such that they are condemned to be—
long there and experience the anguish of be—longing there. (Belong, based on Old 
English gelang, ‘at hand, together with.’) But I will resist this temptation since the 
displacement that has been put to work in the expression ‘children displaced across 
borders’ is neither a matter of length, nor breadth, nor depth, nor duration, but of 
slippage. (I will, however, return to a slippage of hands by way of conclusion.) Here, 
displaced, the traction of place slips away and steals away, like a step (pas) that 
simultaneously ‘takes’ place and fails to take place. Everything that follows is, as 
Blanchot (1992) famously expressed it, a step (not) beyond [Le Pas au-delà]: placed, 
displaced. 
 
Hereinafter, whenever displacement ‘takes’ place, wherever it ‘slips’ into place, 
something very queer has ‘gone’ on. ‘Something is missing from its place, but the lack 
is never missing from it,’ as Derrida (1988, 184) once put it. Accordingly, Derrida gave 
Jacques Lacan’s expression, ‘manque à sa place’ [lack in its place; missing from its 
place], a subtle twist: ‘manque a sa place’ [lack has its place] (Derrida 1988, 177). 
From the moment that someone wrote ‘children displaced across borders’ it should have 
been obvious that we had strayed via the imaginary from the real into the symbolic. For 
‘what is hidden is never but what is missing from its place, as the call slip puts it when 
speaking of a volume lost in a library. ... For it can literally be said that something is 
missing from its place only of what can change it: the symbolic. For the real, whatever 
upheaval we subject it to, is always in its place; it carries it glued to its heel, ignorant of 
what might exile it from it’ (Lacan 1988, 40, italics in the original). Unlike a child 
wedded to the real, assuming that there ever was such a Thing, a child displaced is the 
symbol only of an absence, a flickering signifier, and one cannot say that ‘it must be or 
not be in a particular place but ... it will be and not be where it is, wherever it goes’ 




Displaced in relation to itself, differed and deferred in relation to itself, criss-
crossed by a labyrinthine estrangement from itself, a displaced child steps not (pas) in 
the place where he or she is. Such a child maintains a spectral, flickering presence in the 
‘here and now’ of the real, so called, due to the fault (faux pas) of the symbolic. At this 
very moment in the text, when one says ‘children displaced across borders,’ such a child 
‘can have and lose its place only in the symbolic register’ (Muller and Richardson 1988, 
59). Like Lacan’s inspired psychoanalytic reading of Edgar Allan Poe’s (1988 [1844]) 
famous tale of ratiocination, The Purloined Letter, in which ‘the fateful letter is not 
stolen so much as dis-placed, that is, ‘purloined’ in the sense of ‘pro-longed’ or 
‘diverted from its path’ along the circuit of the symbolic order,’ so too with a purloined 
child, whose errant place and path of errancy, so to speak, ‘is determined by the 
symbolic system within which it is constantly dis-placed’ (Muller and Richardson 1988, 
58–59). Such a purloined child ‘has the property of nowhereness. ... As symbol of an 
absence, it is and is not wherever it may be. The truly hidden is what is missing from its 
place, and such placing is a function of the symbolic order’ (Muller and Richardson 
1988, 79). Here, then, a displaced child is hidden and trafficked in plain sight, even if he 
or she also disappears into one of those grim places that are often employed by more or 
less roguish states to ‘take care’ of all sorts of displaced persons (Bryson and Poucki 
2019, Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al. 2014, Netz 2009, Piotrowicz 2019, Stone 2017). 
 
Properly displaced: go figure, figure out 
 The Governments accepting this Constitution, RECOGNIZING: that genuine refugees 
and displaced persons constitute an urgent problem ... (Constitution of the International 
Refugee Organization, United Nations, 15 December 1946, Preamble) 
 
In the context of borders and rights—but also of boards and edges, boundaries and 
frontiers, and lines and limits, as well as claims and entitlements, demands and dues, 
and inscriptions and titles, etc.—one may be forgiven for thinking of so-called 
‘displaced children’ as a variant of the well-worn theme of ‘displaced persons,’ and a 
belated recognition that reference to the latter has tended to presume men as its 
unremarked norm despite all of the evidence to the contrary, such that the figure of 
displacement would hereinafter be ramified, serialized, and serrated: displaced men, 
displaced women, displaced children, displaced orphans, etc. (and let’s not forget the 
vast array of displaced nonhumans, from insects to climates). The task posed by the 
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General Assembly of the United Nations on the 12th February 1946, amid the ruins of 
yet another world war, was, in the words of Resolution 8(1), under the heading 
‘Question of Refugees,’ that of ‘clearly distinguishing between genuine refugees and 
displaced persons, on the one hand, and the war criminals, quislings and traitors ... on 
the other.’ All of these words should continue to give us pause for thought, beginning 
with the question of the question and its dismemberment, not least because the question 
is invariably posed as a problem, a sleight of hand that transforms ‘refugees’ or 
‘displaced persons’ into a problem, and the solution to the problem amounts to sorting 
the wheat from the chaff. Who, precisely, should be gathered up and ‘rounded up’ as a 
‘displaced person’ – both figuratively (in the accounts) and literally (in the camps, in the 
streets, in the borderlands, etc.)? Who, precisely, should be hailed as a ‘displaced 
person’ and forced to respond to the call of his or her name? ‘Hey, you there!’ as Louis 
Althusser (1971) succinctly expressed it in his famous essay on ideological state 
apparatuses and the interpellation of the subject. And who, precisely, should be claimed 
and reclaimed by place, or detained and interned in place, or even swallowed up and 
consumed by place? Hereinafter, whenever you stumble upon words such 
‘accommodate,’ ‘assimilate,’ and ‘integrate,’ and similar words lumbered with 
‘integrity’ that are tossed around ‘displaced persons’ and other social misfits in a more 
or less carelesswise fashion, attune yourself to the violence of rounding up, which 
wounds and scars not only those who are discounted, those who come to count for 
nothing in the ‘fabric of society,’ so called, or else marked down and tallied up as 
dangerous ‘remainders’ that need to be tracked down, hunted down, and taken care of, 
but also those who are counted upon for being ‘integral’ to society, for just being there, 
where they purportedly belong (Lyotard 1990b, Fleischman et al. 2013). We will circle 
back to this rounding up in what follows. 
 
Having posed the ‘question of refugees,’ the UN considered that ‘the main task 
concerning displaced persons [was] to encourage and assist in every way possible their 
early return to their countries of origin,’ with the caveat that none ‘shall be compelled to 
return.’ Meanwhile, an exception to this desire for repatriation was made for war 
criminals, quislings, and traitors—and also for Germans, with a non-refoulement 
obligation subsequently appended via the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees. Much later, as late as the 1990s, it would finally dawn on the UN that the so-
called question of refugees and displaced persons primarily concerned ‘women and 
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children’ (to wit, UN Economic and Social Council Resolution 1991/23, on Refugee 
and Displaced Women and Children). This belated yoking of ‘women and children’ to 
the question/problem of ‘refugees and displaced persons’ has continued unabated ever 
since, often under the cover of all that is familial and communal, and invariably drawing 
upon the threefold assertion that children require ‘special care and assistance’ because 
they are ‘vulnerable,’ ‘dependent,’ and ‘developing’ (UN Convention on the Rights of 
the Child 1989, UNHCR Refugee Children: Guidelines on Protection and Care 1994). 
 
The question of refugees and displaced persons, so forcefully formulated in the 
wake of the Second World War, has itself been dis-placed in the subsequent half 
century or so. It has been dis-placed in two directions, at least. First and foremost, it has 
been dis-placed from being exclusively a question that concerned discerning the 
genuinely displaced, the internationally ‘dehomed’ or ‘dehoused,’ so that they may be 
encouraged, supported, and assisted in their venture or adventure to return ‘home,’ to 
return to their ‘country of origin,’ a return that was driven not so much by the desire of 
individuals for the right abode or the right to abode than by the desire of states to recoup 
their citizens. States wanted to take their subjects back into custody, to reclaim their 
unlost and refound souls. They wanted to reappropriate those who had been ex-
appropriated and expropriated (the dislodged and the taken, such as refugees and 
prisoners of war), the most voracious of which was the Soviet Union. Needless to say, 
states did not necessarily want to recoup all of their misplaced citizens, nor did they 
necessarily wish to retrieve them for humanitarian reasons. Many who were returned to 
their ‘homeland’ lived under a cloud of suspicion (as de facto renegades, defectors, 
deserters, traitors, cowards, fraternizers, etc.), facing stigmatization, marginalization, 
and maltreatment at ‘home,’ but also punishment, imprisonment, internal exile, and 
even death. Moving away from this original concern with the restitution of the 
genuinely displaced, the question of refugees and displaced persons was dis-placed from 
sifting the genuine from the bogus onto a question that concerned ‘women and children’ 
in particular, partly because they were in the ‘majority,’ for when it comes to the subject 
of the question, the subjects that will be put to the question, women and children are 
evidently more numerous amongst the displaced than men. More importantly, however, 
the dis-placement of the subject of the question from discerning the bogus amid the 
genuine and the treacherous amid the faithful to a notable concern for women and 
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children was primarily because women and children—and particularly ‘unaccompanied 
children’ or ‘separated children’—were widely regarded as especially vulnerable. 
 
For reasons that are not entirely arbitrary, the UN settled upon a certain 
calendrical age to mark the outer limits of childhood, whereafter one would yield to 
adulthood: ‘the age of eighteen years unless under the law applicable to the child, 
majority is attained earlier,’ as Article 1 of the UN’s Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (1989) defined it. Whence the agony of rounding up children in the absence of 
credible documentation, especially in the borderlands and rim-lands of childhood and 
adulthood, in the age-disputed no man’s land of ‘adolescence’ and ‘youth,’ not to 
mention in the vicinity of retardation, decrepitude, and infantilization, but also the 
agony of rounding them up in the streets and elsewhere, in the real, imaginary, and 
symbolic registers. And so, I ask again: who, precisely, should be rounded up as a child 
or an infant, as childish or infantile? And who, precisely, should be rounded up in the 
world and rounded up in the accounts? Indeed, who, precisely, has the wherewithal to 
be rounded up in this way? And who, precisely, has the wherewithal to round them up? 
We will return to this rounding up in due course. 
 
In addition to the dis-placement of the question of refugees and displaced 
persons onto a question of more or less crude demographics (i.e. women and children), 
a second dis-placement has transposed the question from one of international 
displacement across state borders to one of so-called ‘internal displacement’ within a 
state’s borders. While both international and internal displacement can arise from the 
same wide array of forces, including so-called ‘natural disasters’ as well as warfare, 
genocide, ethnic cleansing, contrived famine, and suchlike, their emplacements and 
displacements once again beg the question of place, and specifically the place of 
displacement and the taking place of displacement, to which I finally return. For while 
the notion of ‘internal displacement’ is obviously oxymoronic, it is not entirely without 
merit, since the schismatic ‘fault’ that cuts through and unhinges the notion concerns 
place itself and as such, and not simply the distance between places. So, rather than 
displacement from place to place, I am interested in the displacement of place and the 
place of displacement. Where, in deed, does displacement ‘take’ place? And what 




At this very moment in the text here I am 
I’m not from here either! (Handwritten cardboard placard, held aloft by a child during 
the so-called ‘European Migration Crisis,’ September 2015) 
 
Placed. Displaced. Each takes place. (I am tempted to insert a parenthetical remark 
between the ‘takes’ and the ‘place’ in order to gesture towards the hollowing out and 
sweeping away of some more or less snug space for what will have come to pass, an 
‘(its)’ or an ‘(a)’ perhaps.) Children placed, displaced. What happens, I wonder, when 
this double take is crossed or double-crossed by a border or when a border is crossed or 
double-crossed by this double take? Is a child, placed, displaced, marked and remarked 
or raised and erased by this repetition of placements and emplacements, of incisions and 
divisions, of scars and cuts, of lacerations and seriations, etc.? ‘We know less than ever 
where to cut—either at birth or at death. And this also means that we never know, and 
never have known, how to cut up a subject. Today less than ever’ (Derrida 1991, 117, 
italics in original). Here as elsewhere, the subject takes (its) place (or a place) as ‘a 
stringed series of enlaced erasures’ (Derrida 2007, 175), of serial erasures, for which 
Derrida coined the beautiful neologism ‘seriasure.’ Every child is a child of seriasure. 
Even a totally crass understanding of childhood, such as one that fixates on the plodding 
of calendrical age, disaccumulates as it tallies up, and erases as it notches up. Every 
child becomes younger with respect to adulthood and older with respect to childhood; 
older than they were and younger than they will become. Child A, let’s call her Alice, 
can neither advance without retreating nor retreat without advancing. Becoming is the 
perpendicular stationary trip, or ‘loco-commotion,’ that takes flight between these two, 
reversible directions, hollowing out a child from the middle. 
 
When I say ‘Alice becomes larger,’ I mean that she becomes larger than she was. By the 
same token, however, she becomes smaller than she is now. Certainly, she is not bigger 
and smaller at the same time. She is larger now; she was smaller before. But it is at the 
same moment that one becomes larger than one was and smaller than one becomes. This 
is the simultaneity of a becoming whose characteristic is to elude the present. Insofar as it 
eludes the present, becoming does not tolerate the separation or the distinction of before 
and after, or of past and future. It pertains to the essence of becoming to move and to pull 
in both directions at once: Alice does not grow without shrinking, and vice versa. Good 
sense affirms that in all things there is a determinable sense or direction (sens); but 




Spaced, Displaced, says Michaux (1992). ‘In the beginning is REPETITION’ (Michaux 
1992, 101, capitalization in original). Is there a difference there? Between the placed 
and the displaced. Between a child placed here or there and a child displaced here or 
there. Each takes (its) place, finding itself lost where it is found. ‘A thing that isn’t there 
is there,’ as Auster (1994, 167) put in Mr Vertigo. The placed always already displaced 
and the displaced always already placed. Place takes place. Re-read the ambiguity and 
ambivalence of this phrase. It is no longer certain—is never certain, in fact and in 
deed—what is ‘in’ place and what is ‘out’ of place. Run out. Behold the hollows of our 
‘ex-sistence (or: eccentric place),’ as Lacan (1988, 28, italics in the original) wryly put 
it. Placed, displaced. In the round, this errant twain forms a Möbius strip, with a single 
surface and a single border, which causes not so much the ‘dis-’ but the ‘di-’ to 
reverberate the length and breadth of its space. Dis-placed or di-spaced, so to speak. 
 
Placed, displaced. I hesitate, then, between what takes place and what takes 
place, or, if you prefer, between taking place and the taking place, or even between the 
taken place and the taking (of) place. Rather than a bare repetition of the same, of the 
different or of the same difference (on and on, again and again), there is an eternal 
return or double movement of a différance that endlessly differs and defers what 
ostensibly takes place. Hereinafter, (dis)placement takes (its) place. I hesitate, then, 
before reading too much or too little into the difference between children placed and 
children displaced, or between displaced children and placed children. And yet, like 
‘younger’ and ‘older,’ ‘placed’ and ‘displaced’ are ostensibly two words that pull in 
opposite directions. Affirmation on the one hand and negation on the other hand, which 
is not necessarily to say that to be placed is to be well placed, properly placed or 
rightfully placed nor that to be displaced is to be badly placed, improperly placed or 
wrongly placed, nor that to be either placed or displaced is to be misplaced. Here as 
elsewhere, nothing is lost in reality or to reality, only in the symbolic and the imaginary. 
 
A child displaced is not simply ‘misplaced’ or ‘mal-placed’ in the real, or left 
‘without place’ or left ‘out of place’ in the imaginary. Such a child does not lack place, 
least of all a ‘proper place’ or a ‘resting place,’ that some may be tempted to call a 
‘home’ or a ‘homeland’ or some such. The word displaced keeps bringing me back to a 
purloined and prolonged place that remains impossible to pin or pen down, rather than 
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to a set or series of places that may be occupied or vacated with more or less propriety, 
legitimacy, embedment, etc. Displacement leaves a trace that takes place, a trace that 
effaces itself at every step along the way. Accordingly, the phrase ‘displaced children 
across borders’ reminds me of Blanchot’s (1992) The Step Not Beyond, which plays on 
the polysemy of the French word ‘pas,’ in so far as it makes sense in the registers of 
both transgression (pas, step) and prohibition (pas, not), of both mobility and 
immobility (pas, step/not). ‘Because of the double meaning of pas, every step is a false 
step’ (Nelson, in Blanchot 1992, xvi). A displaced child leaves a step/not (pas) in every 
place, a false step/do not (faux pas/faut pas) in the very structure of place—and, as we 
have seen, also in the structure of time: the paradoxical pace (pas) of ageing qua 
becoming, for instance. What the displaced child demonstrates is not that some 
unfortunate souls are misplaced or mal-placed, that some people are out of place and do 
not belong here or there, and that we should try to put this maladjustment right either by 
returning them whence they came (homeward bound) or else by making them belong 
here (through more or less forcible integration), but that we all step/not in each and 
every place. The fault belongs to place itself. The fault is place itself. The fault is what 
takes place. Here as elsewhere, ‘the pas both creates and erases the limit in its crossing’ 
(Nelson, in Blanchot 1992, xvi). 
 
At the outset of this paper I floated a quotation from Badiou’s Theory of the 
Subject: ‘Everything that exists is thus at the same time itself and itself-according-to-its-
place. ... All that is relates to itself at a distance from itself owing to the place where it 
is’ (Badiou 2009a, 8). This queer formulation derives from his Hegelian appreciation of 
‘the dialectical correlation between being and being-there, between essence and 
existence’ (Badiou 2009c, 100). Such a correlation is the step/not (pas) of dis-
placement. Take a child, for example, whose destiny is to be split into three, at least: as 
a being (essence, pure identity), a being-there (existence, placed identity), and a being 
there (ex-sistence, displaced identity). The latter is the unity of being and being-there, 
the unity of ‘being-there-in-a-world, whose principle is to consist’ (Badiou 2009c, 39), 
the tally or count-as-one of a unary trait that begins with difference and repetition, a 
tally that may range from a minimal (nil) to a maximal (full) degree of appearance 
within a particular world (Badiou 2009c). Changes of degree often occur gradually and 
imperceptibly, but they can also shift abruptly and dramatically. One may age slowly, 
for example, but also catastrophically, in a flash (Malabou 2012). Age is not simply a 
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tallying that goes on and on through serial repetition; it is also a transformation and 
transmutation, a difference in kind rather than a difference of degree, a ‘becoming’ and 
a ‘stationary trip,’ as Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (1988) once put it. Placed, 
displaced, one steps/not into every age. 
 
So, let’s begin to count and recount the children, rounding them up along the 
way: one one, which is to say: placed displaced. Follow the torsion, contortion, and 
distortion of this notching up of a duplicitous ‘unary trait,’ as Lacan famously dubbed it 
in his seminar of 1961–1962 (Seminar IX: Identification), if you can. And whilst 
tallying them up, notching them up, making them count, count-for-one and count-as-
one, which may be a one one or a one zero, bear in mind that duplicates and 
counterparts were once called tallies. Take any old child, whether they count or not. 
Child A, for example. A child (A) is always placed (AP), with more or less visibility 
(inclusion, appearance, recognition, etc.) within a world, and insofar as it is re-marked 
by place, it is also other than itself, estranged from itself, and a stranger to itself: (A = 
A, AP), where ‘P’ denotes the set of possible places in the space of placement. I repeat: 
‘Everything that exists is thus at the same time itself and itself-according-to-its-place. ... 
All that is relates to itself at a distance from itself owing to the place where it is’ 
(Badiou 2009a, 8). Consequently, the true initial contrary of A is therefore neither 
something else (Not-A) nor A placed (AP), but the space of placement (P) as such. Just 
as the contrary of the working class is not the capitalist class, but the class structure as 
such, so the contrary of displaced children is not placed children, but the space of places 
as such. As its name implies, a re-placement, like a re-volution, has no purchase 
whatsoever on the space of placement. No child should be subjected to the structure of 
places, least of all one in a chequered state. ‘Scission is that by which the term [A] is 
included in the place [P] as out-of-place [Ap]’ (Badiou 2009a, 15, parentheses added). 
The important point, however, is that the scission of A/P is asymmetrical: ‘one term is 
dominant, another subjugated. One term fixes the game of assigned places; the other 
must subject itself to it’ (Badiou 2009a, 25). The space of placement (P), for which 
Badiou coined the neologism ‘splace,’ is the including (dominant) term that indexes, re-
marks, and stamps (with existence, with being-there). The term (A), for which Badiou 
coined the neologism ‘outplace’ with respect to the splace, is the included (subjugated) 
term that is indexed, re-marked, and stamped. The phrase ‘children displaced’ is 
sufficient to foreground the subject’s subjugation not to any particular place but to the 
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space of placement as a faulty whole. The gratuitous addition of ‘across borders’ is 
sufficient to foreground the derangement or ‘locommotion’ of any such space. Here as 
elsewhere, the splace is demented, yet works very well (q.v. Deleuze, in Guattari 2009, 
36). And since splace is deranged, every place is de-ranged. Whether moving between 
places or moving within places, we are forever ‘approaching without getting nearer’ 
(Derrida 2008, 21). 
 
By way of conclusion: re-enforced displacement 
There where the old coherence prescribed a mere sliding displacement, an interruption 
arises through a purification that exceeds the place. ... From this point of view, ... there 
is ... only one force, whose existence always surfaces as an event. (Badiou 2009a, 142) 
 
When all is said and done, the key struggle is not between children and any particular 
placement, least of all a misplacement, mal-placement or displacement, but between 
children and the space of placement as such. Rather than falling back onto place (re-
structure, re-arrange, re-place) we should strive to overthrow the space of placement 
itself (de-structure, dis-arrange, dis-place). ‘The essence of the relapse is the space of 
placement, the place,’ while the real struggle ‘is the outplace against the splace’ (Badiou 
2009a, 10–11). This is why I would prefer to follow in the step/not (pas) of so many 
displaced children. ‘We must keep steadily out of place. This is not feasible without the 
redoubling of the place by that which is no longer of its order and which is no longer 
spatially figurable. That is to say, force after place’ (Badiou 2009a, 21). Hereinafter, I 
will simply place force after place, and so re-place place with force. For while it is true 
that there are only children and places, there are also exceptions (aside from, but for). 
All is dis/placed, then. ‘What we believe to be in front of us, as Lacan puts it brilliantly, 
is being-to-the-side, para-being, par-appearing. ... “Let us para-be,” that is our war cry. 
And better yet: “We are nothing, let us para-be the Whole”’ (Badiou 2009a, 124). For 
here and there, now and then, approaching without getting any nearer or further away, is 
another world that is taking (its) place as we speak. It is barely a step away, bordering 
on oblivion. By way of a parting shot at all manner of border-enforcement agencies, 
suffice to say that at this very moment in the text here I am, with two children, one 
displaced, the other not, a switcheroo of placements that reinforces the work of the 
border as a transformer. Obviously, a border marks the passage from one state to 
another, from one sovereign power to another. Before this power a child is neither 
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placed nor displaced. To purloin the phraseology of Foucault (2004, 240), one might 
say that from the point of view of placement and displacement the child is neutral, and it 
is thanks to the sovereign space of placement that the child has the right to be placed or, 
possibly, the right to be displaced. Imagine, then, children placed, displaced across 
borders. Imagine that they have come here, that each is present to hand, that each is on 
hand: ‘Hand in hand with equal plod they go. ... Joined by held holding hands. Plod on 
as one’ (Beckett 2009, 84). Placed, displaced, with equal plod we all go on. Disjoined 






Althusser, L. 1971. Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays. New York: Monthly 
Review. 
Auster, P. 1994. Mr Vertigo. London: Faber and Faber. 
Badiou, A. 2009a. Theory of the Subject. London: Continuum. 
Badiou, A. 2009b. Pocket Pantheon. London: Verso. 
Badiou, A. 2009c. Logics of Worlds: Being and Event 2. London: Continuum. 
Beckett, S. 2009. Company, Ill Seen Ill Said, Wortsward Ho, Stirring Still. London: 
Faber and Faber. 
Blanchot, M. 1992. The Step Not Beyond. Albany, NY: SUNY. 
Bryson Clark, J. and Poucki, S. Eds. 2019. The SAGE Handbook of Human Trafficking 
and Modern Day Slavery. London: Sage. 
Casey, E. (2009). Getting Back Into Place: Toward a Renewed Understanding of the 
Place-World. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. 
Coover, R. 2005. A Child Again. San Francisco, CA: McSweeney’s. 
Cresswell, T. 2013. “Displacements: three poems.” The Geographical Journal 103 (2): 
285–287. doi: 10.1111/gere.12018. 
De León, J. 2015. The Land of Open Graves: Living and Dying on the Migrant Trail. 
Berkeley, CA: California University Press. 
Deleuze, G. 1990. The Logic of Sense. London: Athlone. 
Deleuze, G. 2004. Desert Islands and Other Texts 1953–1974. New York: Semiotext(e). 
Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. 1988. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia. London: Athlone. 
Derrida, J. 1982. Margins of Philosophy. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
Derrida, J. 1986. Glas. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press. 
Derrida, J. 1988. “The purveyor of truth.” In The Purloined Poe: Lacan, Derrida, and 
Psychoanalytic Reading, edited by J. P. Muller and W. J. Richardson, 173–212. 
Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Derrida, J. 1991. “‘Eating well,’ or the calculation of the subject: an interview with 
Jacques Derrida.” In Who Comes After the Subject? edited by E. Cadava, P. Connor, 
and J.-L. Nancy, 96–119. Abingdon: Routledge. 
Derrida, J. 2007. Psyche: Inventions of the Other, Volume 1, edited by P. Kamuf and E. 
Rottenberg. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Derrida, J. 2008. Parages. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
DOI: 10.1080/14733285.2020.1773403 
 21 
Derrida, J. 2014. Cinders. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. 
Doel, M. A. 1999. Poststructuralist Geographies: The Diabolical Art of Spatial 
Science. Edinburgh. Edinburgh University Press. 
Doel, M. A. 2014. “Montage and geography, or, splicing splace.” You Are Here: The 
Journal of Creative Geography, XVII, 7-13. [Accessed 13 March 2020] 
https://youareheregeography.files.wordpress.com/2014/12/doel2.pdf 
Eckenwiler, L. (2018). “Displacement and solidarity: an ethic of place-making” 
Bioethics 32 (9): 562–568. 
Eriksson, C. 2019. “The art of displacement – curating a preschool context in a public 
transport system.” Children’s Geographies. doi: 10.1080/14733285.2019.1668913. 
Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, E., Loescher, G., Long, K. and Sigona, N. Eds. 2014. The Oxford 
Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Fleischman, R. K., Funnell, W. and Walker, S. P. Eds. 2013. Critical Histories of 
Accounting: Sinister Inscriptions in the Modern Era. Abingdon: Routledge. 
Foucault, M. 2004. Society Must Be Defended. London: Penguin. 
Guattari, F. 2009. Chaosophy: Texts and Interviews 1972–1977. Los Angeles, CA: 
Semiotext(e). 
Lacan, J. 1988. “Seminar on ‘The Purloined Letter.’” In The Purloined Poe: Lacan, 
Derrida, and Psychoanalytic Reading, edited by J. P. Muller and W. J. Richardson, 
28–54. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Lyotard, J.-F. 1990a. Duchamp’s TRANS/formers. Venice, CA: Lapis. 
Lyotard, J.-F. 1990b. Heidegger and ‘the jews.’ Minneapolis, MN: University of 
Minnesota Press. 
Malabou, C. 2012. Ontology of the Accident: An Essay on Destructive Plasticity. 
Cambridge: Polity. 
Malabou, C. and Derrida, J. 2004. Counterpath: Traveling with Jacques Derrida. 
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Michaux, H. 1992. Spaced, Displaced: Déplacements, Dégagements. Newcastle upon 
Tyne: Bloodaxe. 
Muller, J. P.  and Richardson, W. J.  1988. “Lacan’s seminar on ‘The Purloined Letter’: 
overview, map of the text, and notes to the text.” In The Purloined Poe: Lacan, 
Derrida, and Psychoanalytic Reading, edited by J. P. Muller and W. J. Richardson, 
55–98. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
DOI: 10.1080/14733285.2020.1773403 
 22 
Netz, R. 2009. Barbed Wire: An Ecology of Modernity. Middletown, CT: Wesleyan 
University Press. 
Perec, G. 1999. Species of Spaces and Other Pieces. Penguin: London. 
Piotrowicz, R. Ed. 2019. Routledge Handbook on Human Trafficking. Abingdon: 
Routledge. 
Poe, E. A. 1988. “The Purloined Letter.” In The Purloined Poe: Lacan, Derrida, and 
Psychoanalytic Reading, edited by J. P. Muller and W. J. Richardson, 6–27. 
Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Strauven, F. 1998. Aldo van Eyck: The Shape of Relativity. Architectura & Natura: 
Amsterdam. 
Stone, D. 2017. Concentration Camps: A Short History. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
